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Finality in the criminal process is essential to the effective 
administration of justice,1 but where an undisputed sentencing error 
amounts to a miscarriage of justice, a defendant may obtain post-
conviction relief.2 
The Seventh Circuit allowed such relief in Narvaez v. United 
States.3 In Narvaez, the defendant was erroneously sentenced as a 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate; expected graduation May 2014 from Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. Undergraduate degree from Minnesota State 
University, B.S. in History with a Political Science minor. I would like to thank my 
lovely wife, Anna, for her constant support, and dedicate this article to our son, 
Benson, whose arrival made the final year of law school sleepless and full of joy. 
1 See United States v. Addonozio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11 (1979). 
2 See, e.g., Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011). 
3 See generally id. 
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career offender under the then-mandatory United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”).4 Two years 
later, in Hawkins v. United States (hereinafter Hawkins I), the Seventh 
Circuit denied relief under circumstances that were nearly identical to 
those that warranted relief in Narvaez.5 The court distinguished 
Hawkins I from Narvaez because the Hawkins I defendant was 
sentenced at a time where the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, 
rather than mandatory.6 According to the court, a sentencing error 
under the advisory Guidelines was “less serious” because the 
sentencing judge had ample discretion to depart from the 
recommended sentencing range.7 
 Four months after the Seventh Circuit decided Hawkins I, the 
Supreme Court decided Peugh v. United States.8 In Peugh, the Court 
held that a misapplication of the advisory Guidelines could give rise to 
an Ex Post Facto Clause violation.9 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court observed that, although the Guidelines are no longer binding on 
judges, the Guidelines still “exert controlling influence on the sentence 
that the court will impose”10 and “achieve binding legal effect through 
a set of procedural rules and standards for appellate review that, in 
combination, encourage district courts to sentence within the 
guidelines.”11 
In light of Peugh, Hawkins requested that the Seventh Circuit 
reconsider his plea for post-conviction relief.12 Peugh arguably 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s distinction between mandatory and 
                                                 
4 See generally id. 
5 See generally, Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Hawkins I]. 
6 Id. at 822. 
7 See id. at 824. 
8 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013). 
9 Id. at 2083–84. 
10 Id. at 2085. 
11 Id. at 2086 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432–33 (1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
12 See generally Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Hawkins II]. 
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advisory Guideline sentencing errors.13 In Hawkins v. United States 
(hereinafter Hawkins II), the court found Peugh inapplicable to its 
analysis in Hawkins I on the basis that Peugh did not address a plea for 
post-conviction relief, and affirmed its decision to deny Hawkins’s 
motion.14 This Comment argues for a different result, taking the stance 
that Peugh’s broad analysis of the post-Booker, advisory Guideline 
regime undercut the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for denying relief in 
Hawkins I. 
First, this Comment provides relevant background information 
regarding the Sentencing Guidelines, the standards that govern post-
conviction relief, and the Seventh Circuit’s application of those 
standards in Hawkins I. Then, this Comment explains the Peugh 
decision and the Seventh Circuit’s rationale behind its decision in 
Hawkins II. Finally, this Comment argues that, contrary to the court’s 
holdings in Hawkins II, the Peugh decision illustrates the binding legal 
effect of advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and demonstrates that 





A. An Overview of the Federal Sentencing Scheme 
 
Until 1984, federal sentencing judges possessed nearly unbridled 
discretion to impose prison sentences under the then-indeterminate 
sentencing system,15 which produced sentencing disparity across the 
federal courts.16 Congress then determined that inconsistent criminal 
sentences were “a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective 
                                                 
13 See id. at 916. 
14 Id. at 916–17. 
15 Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (noting “Statutes specified 
penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to 
decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long.”). 
16 Id. at 366. 
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operation of the criminal justice system.” 17 In response to this 
concern, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) of 
1984.18 The SRA brought uniformity to the sentencing process by 
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
“Commission”), which promulgates Sentencing Guidelines.19 The 
Sentencing Guidelines serve as a rubric for calculating the appropriate 
sentencing range for “each category of offense and each category of 
defendant.”20  
While the Guidelines were originally binding upon the sentencing 
judges,21 in Booker v. United States, the Supreme Court converted the 
Guidelines to advisory in order to remedy a Sixth Amendment 
violation.22 The sentencing process remained the same, but the 
sentencing court had greater discretion to impose an outside-the-
Guidelines prison sentence.23 
Under the current, post-Booker procedure, the sentencing court 
still calculates and considers the appropriate Guidelines sentencing 
range, but may depart from the sentencing range as warranted in 
accordance with the sentencing considerations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).24 Should the sentencing court depart from the recommended 
sentencing range, the court must explain its rationale with reference to 
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.25 The Court has noted that “a major 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (2013). 
19 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366–67; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
253 (2005) (“Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the 
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”). 
20 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2006). 
21 Sarah French Russel, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and 
Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 90 (2012) (While the courts were authorized 
to depart from the sentencing range under limited circumstances, “courts viewed the 
Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory”). 
22 Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.  
23 See Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(Rovner, J. dissenting). 
24 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
25 Nelson v. U.S., 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009). 
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departure should be supported by a more significant justification that a 
minor one.”26 On appeal, sentences are reviewed for abuse of 
direction.27 
Sentencing errors, including miscalculating the sentencing range, 
are generally reversible on direct appeal.28 Once a defendant has 
exhausted his appeals, the sentence becomes final.29 At this point, a 
defendant’s ability to obtain relief from the sentencing error is far 
more limited.30 
 
B. Post-conviction Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
 
Once a conviction becomes final, a defendant may seek post-
conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.31 Pursuant to § 2255, a 
prisoner may request that the court vacate, set aside, or correct the 
sentence 
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or 
is otherwise subject to collateral attack.32 
 The remedy that is available to a prisoner under § 2255 is 
identical to that which is available by habeas corpus.33 Section 2255 
was simply enacted to ensure that prisoners could seek post-conviction 
relief in a convenient forum; the forum in which the prisoner is 
confined.34 
                                                 
26 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
27 Id. at 51. 
28 See id. 
29 See Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (a case becomes final 
when it is no longer pending on direct review). 
30 See United States v. Addonozio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008). 
32 Id. 
33 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (citation omitted). 
34 Id. at 427–28 (citation omitted). 
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Just as habeas corpus is reserved for exceptional circumstances, 
the availability of post-conviction relief under § 2255 relief is 
similarly limited.35 Courts generally disfavor collateral review of final 
judgment because such review (1) undermines the public’s confidence 
in the accuracy of judicial decisions; (2) places administrative burdens 
on the court system that interferes with the timely administration of 
justice; and (3) may create evidentiary issues on remand when a 
substantial amount of time has passed since matter was initially 
adjudicated.36 For these reasons, the scope of collateral review under § 
2255 is more limited than direct appeal, meaning that collateral relief 
is not always available even though the claimed error may have 
warranted reversal on direct appeal.37 
If a claimed error is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional, § 
2255 relief is only available if the error constitutes “a fundamental 
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, 
[or] an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure.”38 An error constitutes a miscarriage of justice where it is 
so fundamental as to “[render] the entire proceeding irregular and 
invalid.”39 For example, the Court has held that a miscarriage of 
justice occurs where an individual is imprisoned for “an act that the 
law does not make criminal.”40 Beyond that, the contours of this 
standard remain largely undefined.41 
Circuit courts generally agree that post-conviction relief could be 
granted for a sentencing error, but are reluctant to actually find that a 
                                                 
35 Id. at 428. 
36 See Addonozio, 442 U.S. at 184 n.11 (citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 184. 
38 Hill, 368 U.S. at 428. 
39 Addonozio, 442 U.S. at 186. 
40 Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 347 (1974). 
41 See Russel, supra note 21, at 127-28 (Based on limited instruction from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have “considerable flexibility” to determine whether a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred). 
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sentencing error ever rises to the level of miscarriage of justice.42 In 
the Seventh Circuit, a sentencing error constitutes a miscarriage of 
justice where “a change in the law reduces the defendant’s statutory 
maximum sentence below the imposed sentence.”43 In such a case, 
post-conviction relief is available.44 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Grants Post-Conviction Relief from a 
Sentencing Error after an Intervening Change in the Law 
Demonstrates that the Defendant Should Not Have Been Classified as 
a Career Offender  
 
1. The Career Offender Sentencing Enhancement 
 
Under the SRA, the Commission is tasked with promulgating the 
Sentencing Guidelines.45 While Congress granted the Commission 
some discretion in determining the categories of offenses and 
categories of defendants,46 Congress specifically required that the 
Commission establish higher sentencing ranges for repeat offenders 
who commit crimes of violence.47 In response to this Congressional 
directive, the Commission promulgated U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which is 
commonly known as the career offender enhancement.48 
Under § 4B1.1, a defendant who has at least two prior felony 
convictions for a “crime of violence” is subject to an enhanced 
sentencing range.49 A “crime of violence” means  
                                                 
42 See Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704–05 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 
cases demonstrating the courts’ reluctance to hold that a sentencing error constitutes 
a miscarriage of justice). 
43 Welch v. U.S., 604 F.3d 408, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2010). 
44 Id. 
45 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). 
46 See id. § 994(c)–(d) (listing various factors to consider for each category). 
47 Id. § 994(h). 
48 Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). 
49 Id. at 821; see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 
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any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1) has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another, or (2) [ . . . ] 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.50 
 
The Supreme Court has observed that career offenders are “a 
category of offender [that is] subject to particularly severe 
punishment.”51 On average, a career offender will face a prison 
sentence at least twice as long as he would face absent the career 
offender enhancement.52 To determine whether an offense is a “crime 
of violence,” courts will consider “the statutory elements of the crime, 
rather than the particular facts underlying the conviction.”53 This is 
called the “categorical approach.”54 
 Until 2009, most circuit courts, including the Seventh Circuit, 
considered all felony escape convictions to be violent crimes in the 
context of the career offender enhancement.55 Meaning that every 
escape conviction was treated as a crime of violence, regardless of 
whether the escape was a violent, forcible escape56 or a non-violent, 
walkaway escape.57 This philosophy was premised on the notion that, 
even if the escape itself did not involve violence, there exists a 
                                                 
50 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 
51 Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 60 (2001). 
52 See Russel supra note 21, at 99 (the career offender enhancement “can 
double, triple, or even quadruple a defendant’s sentence”). 
53 See United States v. Franklin, 302 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2002). 
54 Id. 
55 See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2009), reversed, 
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (collecting cases). 
56 See id. (examples of forcible escapes are breaking out of a building and 
wrestling free of guards). 
57 See id. (examples of walkaway escapes are leaving a halfway house, failing 
to report for confinement, and failing to return to confinement). 
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potential for violence while the escapee attempts to avoid recapture.58 
Accordingly, courts reasoned, a felony escape conviction “presents a 
serious potential risk for physical injury to another,” which classifies 
all felony escapes as “crimes of violence” under § 4B1.1.59 
 
2. The Supreme Court Implements a Change in the Law by 
Distinguishing Between Violent and Non-violent Escapes in the 
Context of Sentencing Enhancements 
 
In January 2009, the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. United 
States, in which the Court considered whether the Illinois crime of 
“failure to report for weekend confinement” is a “violent felony” in 
the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).60 Under the 
ACCA, an individual who has “three previous convictions . . . for a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense” and is subsequently convicted 
of being a felon in possession of a firearm faces a mandatory fifteen 
(15) year prison sentence.61 The ACCA defines “violent felony” as a 
“crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” 
that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”62 The definitions of a “violent felony” under the 
ACCA and a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines are 
identical, and, in the Seventh Circuit, judicial interpretations of either 
definition apply to both.63 
In Chambers, the petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of being a 
felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g).64 At sentencing, the Government sought the application of the 
                                                 
58 Franklin, 302 F.3d at 724 (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 
1142 (10th Cir. 1994) “[E]very escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may 
not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, 
but which always has the serious potential to do so.”). 
59 See Chambers, 473 F.3d at 726; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 
60 Chambers v. U.S., 555 U.S. 122, 124–25 (2009). 
61 Id. at 124 (citing 18 U.S.C. 924(e)). 
62 Id.  
63 See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2011). 
64 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 124. 
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ACCA’s fifteen (15) year minimum sentence on the basis of the 
petitioner’s prior criminal convictions.65 The petitioner agreed that two 
of his prior convictions fell within the ACCA’s “violent felony” 
definition, but disputed that a third conviction, for “failing to report to 
a penal institution,” was a “violent felony” that triggered the 
mandatory minimum sentence.66  
In resolving this question, the Court first determined that, for 
purposes of the ACCA, the crime of failure to report is separate and 
distinguishable from the crime of escape from custody.67 The Court 
observed that a failure to report is premised on inaction, which is less 
aggressive and less likely to cause bodily harm than the behavior that 
underlies an escape from physical custody.68 The Court then held that 
the crime of failure to report is not a “violent felony” as defined by the 
ACCA because, based on the available empirical evidence, it did not 
“[present] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”69 
Thus, Chambers rejected the categorical treatment of felony escapes as 
crimes of violence regardless of whether the offense actually involved 
a violent act.70 
 
3. The Seventh Circuit Grants Post-Conviction Relief in Light of 
Chambers Where the Defendant Was Sentenced under the Pre-Booker, 
Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines 
 
In light of Chambers, the Seventh Circuit, in Narvaez v. United 
States, granted post-conviction relief from a prison sentence that was 
premised on a misapplication of the career offender enhancement.71 In 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Following his conviction for robbery and battery, the petitioner was required 
to report to a local prison for eleven (11) weekends of incarceration. He failed to 
report for weekend confinement on four occasions, which led to the conviction that 
was at issue in this case. Id. at 124-25. 
67 Id. at 126–27. 
68 Id. 
69 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128, 130. 
70 See id. at 127. 
71 Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2011). 
10
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Narvaez, the defendant was sentenced as a career offender because he 
had two prior convictions for felony escape where he failed to return 
to confinement.72 The defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era, 
and the career offender enhancement increased the defendant’s then-
mandatory sentencing range from 100-125 months to 151-188 
months.73 After calculating the sentencing range, the judge imposed a 
170-month prison sentence.74 While Chambers made clear that the 
sentencing judge erroneously applied the career offender 
enhancement,75 the court could only grant post-conviction relief if it 
determined that this error constituted a miscarriage of justice.76 
In concluding that a miscarriage of justice occurred, the court 
analogized this case to Davis v. United States.77 In Davis, the Supreme 
Court held that miscarriage of justice occurs where a defendant is 
punished “for an act that the law does not make criminal.”78 The 
Narvaez court found this case analogous because the Narvaez 
defendant’s “career offender” classification was premised on offenses 
that, according to Chambers, could not form the basis for this 
classification.79 In essence, he was punished for offenses the law does 
make punishable.80 The court noted that this error was amplified by 
the fact that the defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era, and 
the judge was required to impose a sentence within the erroneously 
                                                 
72 Id. at 623–24. 
73 Id. at 624. 
74 Id. 
75 The court observed that the Chambers holding could be applied retroactively 
it presented a substantive rule of law that “[prohibits] a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Id.at 626 
(quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997)). 
76 See Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 627–28. 
77 Id. 
78 Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). 
79 See Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 628. 
80 See id. 
11
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enhanced sentencing range.81 Accordingly, the court held that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred.82 
In reaching this holding, the court rejected the government’s 
argument that a miscarriage of justice could not have occurred because 
the defendant was sentenced below the statutory maximum and could 
receive the same sentence on remand.83 The court recognized that by 
labeling the defendant as a career offender, the sentencing court 
“created a legal presumption that he was to be treated differently from 
other offenders because he belonged in a special category reserved for 
the violent and incorrigible.”84 According to the court, while the 
defendant does not have a right to a lower sentence, “he does have an 
absolute right not to stand before the court as a career offender when 
the law does not impose that label on him.”85 
 
 
4. The Seventh Circuit Refuses to Grant Post-Conviction Relief 
Where the Defendant Was Sentenced under the Post-Booker, Advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Two years after Narvaez, the Seventh Circuit decided Hawkins v. 
United States (Hawkins I) in which the defendant, Bernard Hawkins, 
similarly sought post-conviction relief under § 2255.86 Hawkins I 
presented a case that was nearly identical to Narvaez except for one 
detail: Hawkins was sentenced in the post-Booker era where the 
Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, while the Narvaez defendant 
was sentenced under the pre-Booker, mandatory Guidelines.87 This 
                                                 
81 Id. at 628-29. 
82 Id. at 629. 
83 Id. 
84 Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629. 
85 Id. 
86 Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2013). 
87 Id. at 824. 
12
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distinction proved fatal to Hawkins’s motion for post-conviction 
relief.88 
In March 2003, Hawkins pled guilty to assaulting a federal officer 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.89 Hawkins was sentenced as a career 
offender because he had two convictions for felony escape on his 
criminal record.90 Similar to the escapes at issue in Narvaez, both of 
Hawkins’s escapes were non-violent.91 On each occasion, Hawkins 
simply signed himself out of a halfway house and failed to return.92 
Hawkins was sentenced pre-Chambers, however, and both escapes 
were considered “crimes of violence” for sentencing purposes.93 
Taking into account the career offender-sentencing enhancement, 
Hawkins’s sentencing range was 151-180 months.94 If Hawkins had 
not been sentenced as a career offender, his sentencing range would 
have been 15-21 months.95 While the sentencing judge recognized that 
the sentencing range was advisory, the judge sentenced Hawkins to 
151 months in federal prison.96  
Following Chambers and Narvaez, Hawkins sought post-
conviction relief under § 2255.97 While the Seventh Circuit had 
granted post-conviction relief for this type of error in Narvaez, it now 
had to consider whether such relief could be granted now that the 
                                                 
88 Id. at 823–24. 
89 United States v. Hawkins, 136 F. App’x. 922, 923 (7th Cir. 2005). 
90 Id. 
91 See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2011). 
92 Hawkins, 136 F. App’x. at 923. 
93 See id. at 924. 
94 Id. at 923. 
95 Hawkins v. United States,706 F.3d 820, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). 
96 Id. at 823. Hawkins was originally sentenced in the pre-Booker era, which 
would have made this case indistinguishable from Narvaez. See id. at 822. However, 
Booker was decided while Hawkins’s direct appeal was pending in the Seventh 
Circuit. Id. On the authority of Booker, the Seventh Circuit remanded Hawkins’s 
case for resentencing under the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Id. The judge 
initially imposed a 151-month prison sentence pre-Booker, and reentered the same 
sentence post-Booker. Id. 
97 See generally id. 
13
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Guidelines are “merely advisory.”98 Judge Posner, writing for the 
court, acknowledged that the sentencing judge was wrong for treating 
Hawkins’s walkaway escapes as crimes of violence and labeling him 
as a career offender.99 The court held, however, that Hawkins did not 
suffer a miscarriage of justice that could be remedied through post-
conviction relief.100 
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Posner stressed that because 
Narvaez was sentenced in the pre-Booker era where the Guidelines 
“were the practical equivalent of a statute,” his sentence arguably 
exceeded that which was authorized by law.101 In contrast, Hawkins 
was sentenced in the post-Booker era where the sentence is premised, 
primarily, on the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).102 
According to the court, under these circumstances, Hawkins was not 
“punished for conduct that is not punishable” because the sentencing 
court could impose a 151-month sentence based on the various 
sentencing factors rather than the erroneous sentencing 
enhancement.103 
According to Judge Posner, not every error can be corrected 
though post-conviction relief, “even if the error is not harmless.”104 
Post-conviction relief is disfavored in the interest of finality, and not 
every error that is reversible on direct appeal may be corrected years 
later.105 The interest of finality will not justify “[subjecting] a 
defendant to a punishment the law cannot impose on him,” such as a 
sentence that exceeds the mandatory sentencing range.106 However, 
“[an] error in the interpretation of a merely advisory guideline is less 
                                                 
98 Id. at 821. 
99 Id. at 823. 
100 Id. at 824. 
101 See id. at 822. 
102 Id. at 822-23. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. at 823. 
105 Id. at 824. 
106 Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
14
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serious.”107 In that case, the scale is tipped in favor of finality, and 
post-conviction relief is unavailable.108 
Judge Rovner dissented from the court’s decision to deny 
Hawkins’s motion for post-conviction relief.109 In her view, Narvaez 
was clearly controlling and the distinction between mandatory and 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines was “illusory.”110 Additionally, Judge 
Rovner disagreed with the court’s disinclination to allow post-
conviction relief in the interest of finality, noting the significant and 
detrimental effect of a career offender enhancement on the sentencing 
process.111 Put simply, according to Judge Rovner, “finality must not 
trump justice where a court must correct a career offender 
enhancement that all agree was imposed in error.”112 Accordingly, 
Judge Rovner concluded that such an error constitutes a miscarriage of 
justice that entitles Hawkins to post-conviction relief.113 
 
THE CURRENT LAW 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Refuses to Reconsider Hawkins I Despite the 
Supreme Court’s Recognition that the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines 
Have “Binding Legal Effect” 
 
Few Guidelines have as significant of an impact on a defendant’s 
prison sentence as the career offender-sentencing enhancement,114 
which imposes a heightened prison sentence upon violent, repeat 
offenders.115 In Narvaez, the Seventh Circuit granted post-conviction 
relief from a prison sentence that was premised on the misapplication 
                                                 
107 Id. at 824. 
108 Id. at 824–25. 
109 Id. at 825 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
110 Id. at 826 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
111 Id. at 827–28 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 832 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
114 See id. 
115 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 
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of the career offender enhancement.116 While the defendant was 
sentenced in 2003, the sentencing error did not become apparent until 
the Supreme Court decided Chambers in 2009.117 Notably, the 
Narvaez defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era, where the 
erroneously enhanced sentencing range was binding upon the judge.118 
According to the Seventh Circuit, a miscarriage of justice occurred 
when the sentencing judge erroneously “[increased], dramatically, the 
point of departure for [the defendant’s] sentence.”119 
Two years later, in Hawkins I, the court denied post-conviction 
relief from the same sentencing error because the Hawkins defendant 
was sentenced in the post-Booker era.120 Although the sentencing 
judge similarly increased Hawkins’s sentencing range based on the 
misapplication of the career offender enhancement, the court held that 
this error was “less serious” because the post-Booker-judge had 
greater discretion to depart from the erroneously enhanced sentencing 
range.121 According to the court, such an error did not constitute a 
miscarriage of justice that could be remedied through post-conviction 
relief.122 
Thus, taken together, Narvaez and Hawkins I demonstrate that the 
Seventh Circuit has drawn a line between pre-Booker sentencing 
errors and post-Booker sentencing errors, allowing post-conviction 
relief in the former but not the latter. This distinction is premised on 
the perception that the post-Booker Guidelines merely advise, rather 
than bind, the sentencing judges.123 This premise, however, was 
undercut by the Supreme Court’s recognition in Peugh v. United States 
                                                 
116 See generally, Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011). 
117 Id. at 623–24. 
118 Id. at 628–29. 
119 Id. at 629. 
120 Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2013). 
121 Id. at 824. 
122 Id. at 824–25. 
123 Id. at 822-24. 
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that the post-Booker, advisory Guidelines still has “binding legal 
effect.”124  
 
1. The Supreme Court Holds that the Misapplication of Advisory 
Guidelines Can Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 
 
Peugh was decided in June 2013, four months after Hawkins I.125 
In Peugh, the defendant was convicted for crimes committed in 1999 
and 2000, but was sentenced in accordance with the 2009 Sentencing 
Guidelines rather than the more lenient 1998 version that was in effect 
at the time the crimes occurred.126  The Court was presented with the 
issue of whether a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines could 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.127 
An ex post facto law enhances the punishment for a crime after 
the crime has been committed.128 The crux of the government’s 
argument was that the misapplication of merely advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines could not give rise to an ex post facto violation because the 
sentencing court is not required to impose a sentence within the 
recommended sentencing range.129 The Court rejected this contention, 
holding that the post-Booker, advisory Guidelines are the “lodestar of 
sentencing,” and “[a] retrospective increase in the Guidelines range 
applicable to a defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence 
to constitute an ex post facto violation.”130 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that, while 
advisory in nature, the Guidelines achieve “binding legal effect 
through a set of procedural rules and standards for appellate 
review.”131 For example, sentencing courts must calculate the correct 
                                                 
124 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2086 (2013). 
125 See generally id. 
126 Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2078. 
127 Id. at 2079. 
128 See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798). 
129 See Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2081. 
130 Id. at 2084. 
131 Id. at 2086. 
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sentencing range as the first step in the sentencing process.132 A failure 
to do so is grounds for remand.133  Additionally, while a district court 
may impose a non-Guidelines sentence, the court “must consider the 
extent of the deviation and ensure the justification is sufficiently 
compelling to support the degree of the variance.”134 Furthermore, 
even where a judge deviates from the advised sentencing range, the 
sentencing range determines the point from which the sentence is 
adjusted.135 Thus, according to the Court, “the Guidelines are in a real 
sense the basis for the sentence.”136  Moreover, within-Guidelines 
sentences are presumptively reasonable on review, which further 
incentivizes sentencing judges to enter within-Guidelines sentences.137 
Congress created the current sentencing scheme to achieve 
uniformity in federal sentencing.138 The now-advisory Guidelines still 
achieve this purpose.139 Indeed, since 2007, district courts have only 
imposed sentences outside the Guidelines sentencing range in twenty 
percent of cases, absent a Government motion.140  Thus, based on the 
significant influence that the Guidelines exert over the sentencing 
process, the Court held that Guidelines could form the basis of an Ex 






                                                 
132 See id. at 2083. 
133 Id. at 2083 (citation omitted). 
134 Peugh, 133 S.Ct.at 2083. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See Id. 
138 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005). 
139 Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2084. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2084. 
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2. The Seventh Circuit Refuses to Reconsider Hawkins I in Light of 
Peugh 
 
In light of Peugh, Hawkins requested that the Seventh Circuit 
reconsider his motion for post-conviction relief.142  While the court 
recognized that Peugh was arguably significant to Hawkins’s case to 
the extent that “the Court held that an error in calculating a merely 
advisory guidelines range nevertheless invalidated the sentence,” 
Judge Posner, again writing for the court, denied Hawkins’s motion for 
reconsideration.143 
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Posner provided three reasons 
why Peugh does not apply to Hawkins’s motion for post-conviction 
relief.144 First, the Peugh holding was limited to constitutional errors, 
which are not present in Hawkins’s case.145 Second, since Peugh 
concerned an Ex Post Facto Clause violation, Peugh was decided 
against a different legal standard than is applied to Hawkins’s motion 
for post-conviction relief.146 Third, Peugh does not apply retroactively, 
as would be required to incorporate that decision into Hawkins’s 
motion.147 Beyond distinguishing Peugh, Judge Posner reiterated his 
stance in Hawkins I that, while the district court admittedly erred, “the 
social interest in a belated correction of the error [was] outweighed by 
the social interest in the finality of judicial decisions.”148 
Judge Rovner argued for a contrary conclusion in her dissenting 
opinion.149 In her view, the only basis for denying Hawkins’s motion 
in Hawkins I was the perceived distinction between the advisory and 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.150 According to Judge Rovner, this 
                                                 
142 See generally Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013). 
143 Id. at 915–16. 
144 Id. at 916–17. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 917. 
147 Id, at 917. 
148 Id. at 918. 
149 See id. at 919. 
150 Id. at 919–20. (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
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distinction was rejected by Peugh, where the Court “[instructed] that 
the advisory nature of the Guidelines and the presence of discretion 
did not alleviate the infirmities that arise when a sentencing court 
chooses the improper Guideline range as a starting point.”151 And, 
while the Peugh Court considered an ex post facto violation, the 
specific holding is not at issue here.152 Rather, it is the Court’s broad 
reasoning in regard to the legal force and effect of the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines that undercuts the court’s holding in Hawkins 
I.153 Additionally, Judge Rovner elaborated on her concerns regarding 
the majority’s elevation of finality over fairness by noting that, 
wherever the line between fairness and finality may fall, “justice 
requires the ability to rectify substantial uncontroverted judicial errors 




A. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Decided Hawkins’s § 2255 
Motion 
 
The Seventh Circuit got it wrong. Rather than recognize the 
impact of Peugh on the court’s treatment of advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines, the court avoided the issue by holding that Peugh did not 
apply to Hawkins’s challenge.155 As Judge Rovner correctly 
recognized in her dissent, however, the court need not apply the 
holding of Peugh to determine that Hawkins I was wrongly decided.156 
By revisiting Hawkins I in light of Peugh, it is clear that Hawkins 
was entitled to post-conviction relief for two reasons. First, in Peugh, 
the Court articulated general principles regarding the legal effect of 
                                                 
151 Id. at 920 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (citing Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 
2072, 2086 (2013)). 
152 Id. at 921–22 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
153 Id. (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
154 Id. at 922 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
155 Id. at 916–17. 
156 Id. at 921-22 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
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advisory Sentencing Guidelines that align Hawkins I with Narvaez. 
Second, by rejecting the distinction between advisory and mandatory 
Guidelines, the Peugh Court tipped the scale in favor of granting post-
conviction relief and elevating “fairness” over “finality.”  
 
1. The Peugh Decision Aligns Hawkins With Narvaez 
 
In Hawkins I, Judge Posner indicated that, post-Booker, a prison 
sentence is primarily determined by considering the sentencing factors 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).157 As such, the Sentencing Guidelines 
calculation is “less important”158 and a misapplication of the career 
offender enhancement “less serious.”159 Posner is correct, to a certain 
extent. Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines will certainly exert greater 
influence over the sentencing process than advisory Guidelines. 
However, it does not follow that the misapplication of the career 
offender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines does not rise to 
the level of a miscarriage of justice.  
In Narvaez, the court held that a miscarriage of justice occurred 
because the defendant was erroneously classified as a career offender, 
an individual who was deserving of severe punishment.160 The court 
considered this designation to be extremely damaging because the 
erroneously enhanced sentencing range was the “lodestar” for the 
defendant’s sentence.161 Once designated a career offender, the 
defendant could do nothing to “erase that branding or its effect on his 
sentence.”162 For this reason, the court concluded that a defendant has 
“an absolute right not to stand before the court as a career offender 
when the law does not impose that label on him.”163 
                                                 
157 Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2013). 
158 Id. at 822. 
159 Id. at 824. 
160 Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 629. 
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Just like the defendant in Narvaez, Hawkins was erroneously 
branded as a career offender and subjected to a higher sentencing 
range.164 It would appear, then, that the Narvaez reasoning should have 
applied with full force in Hawkins I.165 Indeed, in Hawkins I, Judge 
Posner recognized that the advisory Guidelines still have an 
“anchoring effect” on a defendant’s prison sentence.166 However, 
Judge Posner nonetheless held that a miscarriage of justice had not 
occurred because the judge was not required to impose a sentence 
within the erroneously enhanced sentencing range.167 
In Peugh, the Court recognized that the advisory Guidelines have 
“binding legal effect”168 and remain the “lodestone of sentencing.”169 
While the advisory Guidelines are not binding by law, they are binding 
in effect.170 Accordingly, Peugh narrowed the gap between the 
mandatory Guidelines in Narvaez171 and the advisory Guidelines in 
Hawkins I.172 
Additionally, Peugh’s effect on Hawkins I is amplified by the fact 
that the Peugh Court challenged the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to 
grant relief from sentencing errors in the post-Booker era. Specifically, 
the Peugh Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Peugh173 and abrogated United States v. Demaree.174 By 
rejecting the rationale of these cases, the Peugh Court arguably 
                                                 
164 Hawkins I, 706 F.3d 820, 825–26 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
165 See id. at 826–27 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
166 Id. at 824 (the “anchoring effect” refers to the tendency for a judge who 
enters a non-guideline sentence to still enter a sentence close to the advised 
sentencing range). 
167 See id. at 824–25. 
168 Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013). 
169 Id. at 2086. 
170 See id. at 2084. 
171 See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2011). 
172 Hawkins I, 706 F.3d 820, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2013). 
173 675 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2012), reversed, Peugh, 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013). 
174 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated, Peugh, 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013). 
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rejected, albeit indirectly, a similar rationale that formed the basis of 
the court’s decision in Hawkins I. 
In United States v. Demaree, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Posner, held that advisory sentencing guidelines 
could not form the basis for a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.175 
While the court acknowledged that sentencing guidelines could be ex 
post facto laws, the court distinguished between pre-Booker and post-
Booker guidelines, and held that “the ex post facto clause should apply 
only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise.”176 The court 
reasoned that, while the applicable advisory Guidelines will “nudge” a 
sentencing court towards a sentencing range, the judge has 
“unfettered” discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable 
range.177 Thus, advisory Sentencing Guidelines could not substantially 
disadvantage the defendant during the actual sentencing process as to 
implicate the ex post facto clause.178 
In Hawkins I, the court relied upon a similar line of reasoning to 
determine that a misapplication of the career offender enhancement in 
the advisory Guidelines era could not give rise to a miscarriage of 
justice.179 In Hawkins I, the court distinguished the pre-Booker and 
post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines, explaining that errors in the post-
Booker era are less serious because the sentencing judge is not 
required to impose a sentence within the recommended range.180 The 
court even went so far as to indicate that calculating the sentencing 
range is irrelevant to the sentencing process.181 
Thus, in both Demaree and Hawkins I, the Seventh Circuit 
distinguished the pre-Booker, mandatory Guidelines from the post-
                                                 
175 Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795. 
176 Id. at 794–95. 
177 Id. at 795. 
178 See id. at 793. 
179 See Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2013). 
180 Id. at 822-23. 
181 See also id. (While the judge must calculate the sentencing range, the judge 
may not presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Rather, the judge 
must consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine 
the appropriate prison sentence). 
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Booker, advisory Guidelines on the basis that, in the post-Booker era, a 
judge has the discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable 
Guidelines range, while in the pre-Booker era he did not.182  
The Peugh Court rejected this rationale by holding that the 
advisory Guidelines have “binding legal effect.”183 Rather than 
“nudge” the sentencing court towards a sentencing range, the advisory 
Guidelines “steer” federal sentences towards the advised sentencing 
range through “a set of procedural rules and standards for appellate 
review that, in combination, encourage district courts to sentence 
within the guidelines.”184 As this distinction formed the basis of the 
court’s decision in Hawkins I, the Peugh decision undercuts the court’s 
reasoning in that case.185 
In Hawkins II, Judge Posner appeared to resolve this contradiction 
by observing that ex post facto challenges and motions for post-
conviction relief are decided against two different standards.186 An ex 
post facto violation occurs where “a change in the law creates a 
significant risk of a higher sentence.”187 Post-conviction relief, in 
contrast, requires “actual prejudice.”188 Accordingly, Judge Posner 
held that, while advisory Guidelines may create a significant risk of a 
higher sentence, it does not follow that a misapplication of the 
Guidelines could also result in actual prejudice.189 
Judge Posner’s concerns are not without merit. In reaching this 
conclusion, however, the court appears to ignore key language from 
Peugh that indicates advisory Guidelines errors can cause actual 
prejudice.190 The Peugh Court specifically observed that the 
                                                 
182 Id. at 824; see Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794-95. 
183 Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2086 (2013). 
184 See id. at 2084, 2086. 
185 Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 920–921 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, 
J. dissenting). 
186 Id. at 917. 
187 Id. (quoting Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2088). 
188 Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 
189 Id. at 917. 
190 See id. at 921 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
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Guidelines are not deprived of “force as the framework for 
sentencing” simply because “a district court may ultimately sentence a 
defendant outside the [applicable] Guidelines range.”191 The potential 
for actual prejudice is further illustrated by the fact that, since 2007, 
the “vast majority” of courts impose a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range or below the applicable range.192 Even under the 
advisory scheme, a misapplication of the career offender enhancement 
“creates a high probability of getting a much higher sentence,”193 
which warrants post-conviction relief. 
 
2. The Peugh Decision Minimizes Concerns Regarding Finality in 
the Criminal Process 
 
Furthermore, in light of Peugh, the sentencing error in Hawkins I 
so closely resembles the sentencing error in Narvaez that the denial of 
post-conviction relief can no longer by premised on the need for 
finality in the criminal process. Certainly, the interest of finality cannot 
be elevated above all other interests, otherwise the judiciary would 
deny all appeals and requests for post-conviction relief.194 The 
question is where to draw the line.195 On one side of the line we have 
Narvaez, and on the other, Hawkins I. By rejecting the distinction 
between advisory and mandatory Guidelines, Peugh pushed Hawkins I 
over the line, thereby entitling Hawkins to post-conviction relief. 
In Hawkins I, Judge Posner recognized that resentencing places 
less of a burden on district courts than does complete retrials, but still 
considered the burden substantial.196 In weighing the interest of 
finality, Judge Posner observed that finality must yield where a 
defendant has received a punishment that is not authorized by law, 
                                                 
191 Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013). 
192 Id. at 2084. 
193 Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 2013). 
194 See Hawkins II, 724 F.3d at 923 (Rovner, J. dissenting). 
195 Id. 
196 Hawkins I, 706 F.3d at 824 (approximately 80,000 prisoners are sentenced 
each year). 
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such as a sentence in excess of a binding sentencing range.197 To the 
contrary, the miscalculation of an advisory sentencing range is “less 
serious,” and cannot be elevated over the interest in finality.198 
 Judge Posner reiterated his stance in Hawkins II, where he 
commented, “[judicial] systems that ignore the importance of finality 
invite unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases.”199 Thus, in 
Hawkins’s case, preventing judicial delay is more important than 
providing post-conviction relief from a sentencing error that may or 
may not have increased the defendant’s prison sentence.200 
 Ironically, it is judicial delay that put Hawkins in this position 
to begin with. Hawkins was originally sentenced under the mandatory, 
pre-Booker Guidelines.201 Booker was decided two years later while 
Hawkins’s direct appeal was still pending.202 The Seventh Circuit 
remanded Hawkins’s case for resentencing under the post-Booker 
advisory scheme.203 On remand, the district court applied the career 
offender enhancement and imposed the same 151-month sentence as 
was entered under the pre-Booker scheme, which was affirmed on 
appeal as reasonable because it was “within a properly calculated 
guidelines range.”204 If Hawkins’s sentence would have become final 
before the Court decided Booker, his case would be indistinguishable 
from Narvaez, and there could be little argument that he would be 
entitled to relief. 
 According to Narvaez, a defendant has “an absolute right not to 
stand before the court as a career offender when the law does not 
impose that label on him.”205 Refusing to grant Hawkins post-
conviction relief because he was sentenced in the post-Booker era 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Hawkins II, 724 F.3d at 918. 
200 Id. at 919. 
201 United States v. Hawkins, 136 F. App’x. 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2005) 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 United States v. Hawkins, 168 F. App’x. 98, 99 (7th Cir. 2006). 
205 Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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appears to contradict the plain language of the Narvaez decision. 
Compounding this apparent injustice is the fact that Hawkins would 
have received his final sentence in the pre-Booker era but for judicial 
delay in deciding his direct appeal.206 Now that Peugh bridges the gap 
between Narvaez and Hawkins I, allowing Hawkins to remain in 
prison arguably calls into question the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. Where such a question can be raised, the court should 





 Hawkins was prejudiced by the misapplication of the career 
offender enhancement and the Seventh Circuit should have granted 
him post-conviction relief. The Seventh Circuit premised its Hawkins I 
decision on the purported distinction between mandatory and advisory 
Guidelines, but the Peugh Court rejected this distinction by 
emphasizing the “binding legal effect” of the post-Booker, advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Narvaez and the Supreme Court’s decision in Peugh, taken together, 
stand for the proposition that the misapplication of a career offender 
enhancement is a miscarriage of justice that can be remedied on post-
conviction relief, regardless of whether the defendant was sentenced 
under the mandatory or advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, 
the Seventh Circuit erroneously denied Hawkins’s motion for 
rehearing in Hawkins II, and, by extension, erroneously denied 





                                                 
206 Hawkins, 136 F. App’x. at 925. 
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